Posted By Eric on May 24, 2013

May 24, 1863 (Sunday)

While the armies of Grant and Banks, Johnston and Pemberton waged a bloody war upon each other in Mississippi and Louisiana, Generals Robert E. Lee and Joseph Hooker had done seemingly little since the Union defeat at Chancellorsville. But though the armies themselves barely moved, in both camps, things were afoot.

Hooker’s got 99 problems, but a friend ain’t one.

On the 13th of May, Hooker’s presence in Washington had been requested by President Lincoln. Hooker had written a long and gloomy letter to Lincoln, explaining the sad state the Army of the Potomac found itself in. Morale was low and, due to the expiration of the terms of service, thousands of troops were leaving the Army. In closing, Hooker told Lincoln, as almost an aside, that he would begin his new campaign the very next day.

Taken aback, Lincoln then summoned Hooker to the White House. The President was completely unconvinced that Hooker could defeat the Confederates with such little planning. Perhaps immediately after the fighting at Chancellorsville, when the enemy was in disarray, but not now – not after they had such a long time to prepare their defenses.

But there was something else for General Hooker to consider. Several of his corps commanders had expressed their distrust of him, requesting another General be placed at the head of the Army of the Potomac. Though Lincoln did not delve into the details, they had proposed General George Meade, commander of the V Corps, for the post.

Through a grapevine that pretty well started and ended with Pennsylvania Governor Andrew Curtain, Hooker found out that Generals Meade and John Reynolds (both hailing from the Keystone State), were not exactly thrilled with Hooker’s performance. Word naturally leaked out into the press and Hooker found himself in the midst of a coup.

However, he did not overreact. In fact, he didn’t act at all, telling Lincoln that it was best if the President handled such matters. But that didn’t mean he was silent. Of his eight corps commanders (including the Cavalry Corps), three were initially friendly to Hooker. Dan Sickles of the III Corps was tried and true, and would be to the end. Otis Howard of the XI Corps, as well as George Stoneman of the Cavalry, owed it to Hooker for their promotions to their current positions. Generals Meade and Reynolds (V and I Corps) had kept mostly quiet about their distrust for Hooker, basically agreeing to serve under him as long as he was around.

Meade would rather not…

And so it was only II Corps commander, Darius Couch, Henry Slocum of the XII, and John Sedgwick of the VI who were most vocal (and Sedgwick hardly said anything at all). Through all of this Couch was in the process of obtaining a transfer out of the Army of the Potomac. The originator and ringleader of the coup could no longer serve under Hooker. Since nobody, especially Hooker, was standing in his way, he was apt to get the transfer.

This would have left Hooker’s Army perhaps a little ruffled, but not irretrievably so. Unfortunately for Hooker, it was his mouth that got him in trouble. The reason for the defeat at Chancellorsville, he claimed, rested squarely upon the shoulders of Howard, Stoneman and Sedgwick – the three corps commanders aside from Sickles, who had very little problem with Hooker. And with that, Hooker was left with but one friend – Daniel Sickles of the III Corps.

Meanwhile, on the other side of the Rappahannock, the Confederates were not going through any of this ridiculous politicking. Even so soon after the death of Stonewall Jackson, General Robert E. Lee was planning his next move.

Lee looks north rather than west.

Two days after Hooker had been summoned to Washington, Lee arrived in Richmond to discuss with Jefferson Davis and Secretary of War James Seddon the coming campaign. Vicksburg loomed large over the room. Davis was obsessed with saving it. Lee’s only remaining Corps commander, James Longstreet, had suggested sending two of his divisions west to reinforce Braxton Bragg in Tennessee. They would defeat William Rosecrans’ Army of the Cumberland, and then turn upon Grant’s Army at Vicksburg.

Lee, whose focus was almost exclusively upon Virginia, did not like the idea at all. He believed that if any troops were detached from his Army of Northern Virginia, he would be forced to retreat into the defenses of Richmond. He was, in a very real way, forcing Davis to pick Virginia over Mississippi – it was looking as if he couldn’t have both.

Lee probably first told his plan to James Longstreet, who quickly came on board. His idea was to cross the Rappahannock, marching north through Maryland to invade Pennsylvania. He argued that his army could not remain on the Rappahannock line for much longer. He feared that Hooker was planning yet another crossing and perhaps this time it would work – one just never knew.

James Seddon and his awesome hat agree.

Another consideration was Virginia herself. The warring armies had picked clean the fields and larders. Lee’s troops were on skinny rations. Perhaps Pennsylvania should feel some of the pains of war. Most of all, Lee was convinced that it would work. He was sure that his last invasion would have been a success had McClellan not moved as quickly as he had. By this time, Lee knew of the “Lost Order,” further convincing him that it was merely a fluke that he was turned back at Antietam.

By the 17th, Lee was preparing his army for the invasion of Pennsylvania. Soon, he would reorganize his force to somehow go on without Stonewall Jackson commanding his half.

And on this day, there was still little movement. Though there was intense broiling within the Union camp, and machinations upon machinations within the Confederate camp, both armies seemed content to remain very much at rest, but for one, that was not so.¹

1. Gettysburg by Stephen Sears; Fighting Joe Hooker by Walter H. Hebert; Here Come the Rebels! by Wilbur Sturtevant Ney; The Gettysburg Campaign by Edwin B. Coddington. [↩]

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Posted By Eric on May 23, 2013

May 23, 1863 (Saturday)

A very cross General Halleck

News and letters from Washington DC to the Mississippi River often traveled at such a slow pace it’s hard to understand why anyone even bothered. On this date, General-in-Chief Henry Halleck received Nathaniel Banks’ letters written on May 2 and 4. In them, Banks explained why he couldn’t help Grant in his campaign against Vicksburg.

When Banks wrote the letters, Grant had just crossed the Mississippi River, though neither Banks nor Halleck was aware of it. By the time that Halleck received Banks’ letters, all he knew about Grant’s campaign was that Mississippi’s state capital, Jackson, had fallen. Banks knew little more. Halleck had no idea that Grant had besieged Vicksburg or that Banks had decided to do the same at Port Hudson.

Nevertheless, Halleck’s frustration over the whole affair was no less real and, with a bit of reasoning, no less poignant.

Several letters back, Banks had openly mused to Halleck that he was planning on joining Grant somewhere east of Vicksburg and taking part in his campaign. Taking Banks at his word, Halleck was disappointed that this didn’t happen. “I regret to learn,” he began, “that you are still pursuing your divergent line to Alexandria.” Of course, Banks’ Divergent Line to Alexandria Campaign had wound down when all the Rebels scurried away. Since then, he had steamed down the Mississippi and decided to besiege Port Hudson.

“If these eccentric movements, with the main forces of the enemy on the Mississippi River,” continued a very irate Halleck, “do not lead to some serious disaster, it will be because the enemy does not take full advantage of the opportunity.”

Now how in the world could you be mad at a hat like that?

Neither Confederate Generals John Pemberton nor Joe Johnston had taken any advantage of any opportunity presented to them at any time during the months of April and May. This was almost fully due to President Jefferson Davis’ complete and baffling insistence upon both Vicksburg and Port Hudson being saved. Rather than focusing upon the defeat of the Union armies (as Joe Johnston urged), Davis focused upon the salvation of cities.

Halleck assured Banks that “the Government is exceedingly disappointed” that he and Grant were “not acting in conjunction.” Though Banks was getting much of the blame for this, Grant had also refused to send troops to Banks – which had been his plan for some time.

Because Banks actually outranked Grant, Halleck had hoped that the prospect of assuming “the entire command as soon as you and General Grant could unite,” would greatly appeal to Banks.

“If Grant should succeed alone in beating the enemy and capturing Vicksburg,” wrote Halleck in closing, “all will be well.” But if Grant was defeated, “both your armies will be paralyzed and the entire campaign a failure.”

While all of these letters were passing, much had changed. Grant had besieged Vicksburg and Banks was, on this date, sealing off Port Hudson. Through a series of skirmishes, Banks’ troops backed the Confederates fully into their entrenchments around the city. They Rebels had tried to break the siege with a sharp counterattack, but it was no use. Banks, it seemed, was in Port Hudson to stay.¹

1. Sources: Official Records, Series 1, Vol. 26, Part 1, p500-501; The Port Hudson Campaign: 1862-1863 by Edward Cunningham. [↩]

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Posted By Eric on May 22, 2013

May 22, 1863 (Friday)

Federal approaches to the Vicksburg defenses.

General Grant’s attack upon the Vicksburg defenses on the 19th had not gone well at all. Nothing was gained because two of his three corps were not ready to launch an attack. Taking a couple of days to rethink the plan, the approaches, and to allow his men to crawl into better positions, believed Grant, would do the trick.

The previous day (the 21st), feeling all was ready, Grant issued the orders for the next day’s attack to begin at 10am. He was, of course, confident that it would succeed. And if it did, he could then turn on Joe Johnston’s force, hovering somewhere north of Jackson, destroying it before even more reinforcements could add to its strength.

Calling his three corps commanders together, Grant had them synchronize their watches with his. There would be no signal aside from the clock striking ten. The men would advance, bayonets fixed, and not fire a shot until they were inside the enemy works. The waiting was nearly unbearable and morale plummeted. Having seen the Confederate works up close, Grant’s troops had quickly lost faith that they could successfully assault them.

The Union artillery had kept up a steady pace since the 19th, but now, as the hour approached, its crescendo reached a steady roar, making it impossible for the opposing Confederates to work their guns in reply. But the quickened pace convinced the Rebels that the attack they knew was coming, was indeed at hand. Risking and giving their lives to beat it back, the Confederate artillerists again took to their pieces, ready to fire canister and grape at the deadly blue lines.

Not quite how Grant spent the battle.

And at ten o’clock they came. All across the lines, William Tecumseh Sherman’s Corps on the right, James McPherson’s in the center, and John McClernand’s on the left, advanced as the Rebels unleashed hell itself upon them.

Sherman’s main assault was led by 150 men – all volunteers – with ladders. Guns strapped to their backs, they rushed forward to bridge the trench placed by the Rebels before their works and the scale the works themselves. Even Sherman knew this plan was doomed, calling the squad, “a forlorn hope.”

When but 100 feet away from the Confederate defenses, the Rebels rose up and delivered a volley into them. Some fell, to be sure, but the majority made it into the relative cover of the trench. It took three minutes and now all they had to do was wait for the rest of the Corps to catch up. While their comrades advanced, some dug holes into the escarpment for better cover, and planted regimental flags along the Rebel lines.

The rest of the troops were coming, but under a galling Rebel fire. Some units raced to the trench, while others fell flat upon the road or hid behind ridges to avoid being hit. The prostrated regiments forced the units behind them to detour, collecting more death as they went.

Today’s Approximate Map is perhaps a little more accurate than usual. Maybe?

Grant’s orderly assault had devolved into separate masses clamoring towards the Confederate works, flowing at will into the cover of the trench. The same story repeated itself all up and down the lines. The Federals would advance in column under a deadly and exacting fire, until they made it to the trench where they found themselves stuck. In this fashion, the hot day tarried on relentless. Throats parched and dried in the sun for lack of water, and many succumbed to heat stroke.

At first, the trench was a refreshing respite. The Confederates could not fire down into it, so close was it to their works. Then someone in gray got the idea to lob hand grenades over the parapets into the Union ranks. At first, their lobbing landed the devices on the other side of the trench, causing little damage to anyone. Then, around noon, after figuring out their error, the Confederates began rolling them down the steep embrasures, right into the Federal masses. The Union troops could sometimes grab the grenades and toss them back into the Rebel lines, but soon the Southerners got wise to this and cut the fuses shorter, so that they would explode as soon as they landed among the Federals.

On the Union left, General McClernand was convinced that he had a breakthrough. He wasn’t entirely mistaken in this. His artillery had succeeded in punching a hole through a log fort and some of his boys from Iowa streamed into it. On the other side of the breech, however, they were greeted with a killing fire that forced them back out and into the trench like the rest of the army.

The break in the Rebel lines!

Seeing the break, McClernand called upon Grant for reinforcements and for General McPherson in the center to create some sort of diversion. Grant quickly replied that if McClernand needed reinforcements, he should use the troops he left in reserve before making the attack. But McClernand somehow failed to retain reserves and had not an extra man to throw in to exploit his supposed advantage.

Undaunted, McClernand wrote back, telling Grant that his men had taken control of two of the Confederate forts – if Grant could only see the stars and stripes floating freely above them! But Grant could see no such thing. From his vantage point that gave him a fine look over the entire front, he only saw pockets of troops huddled in the trench before the Rebel works. Peering through his glass, he saw no Federal flags, no breakthroughs, nothing that McClernand was describing.

General Sherman, who was with him, urged Grant to act upon it. He reasoned that the message was official. It was personally signed by John McClernand, and though nobody really liked him or trusted him even a little bit, Sherman couldn’t believe that a Major-General in the Army of the Tennessee would just make up something of this nature.

But Grant wasn’t so sure, and decided to ride over to McClernand’s lines to see for himself. He ordered Sherman and McPherson to renew the assaults at 3pm, telling the latter to send an entire division to help out McClernand’s supposed breakthrough.

Scaling the parapets.

The renewed assault came and ended just as the first had ended. The troops had collected in the trench and could go no farther. “This is murder,” said Sherman to one of his officers, “order those troops back.” Getting back with the sun still shining was a near impossibility, and so it wasn’t until nightfall that they were able to slide out and back into their own lines.

General Sherman summed it up perfectly in a quick letter to Grant: “We have had a hard day’s work, and all are exhausted.”

To Admiral David Dixon Porter, commanding the Union Naval flotilla nearby, Grant explained that he would need all the help he could get, especially the mortar boats. “I now find the position of the enemy so strong that I shall be compelled to regularly besiege the city,” he wrote.

General McClernand’s report that his men had taken two forts, was, in Grant’s mind, a complete fabrication. It was no mere misunderstanding or faulty intelligence. It was simply a lie told to get reinforcements sent to his own front. For a time, Grant considered relieving McClernand of duty, but, with the General’s strong connections in Washington, coupled with the two failed assaults upon Vicksburg, that might not be the best move.

And so, keeping a close eye upon McClernand’s command, Grant began the long process of digging in and laying siege to the city of Vicksburg.¹

1. Sources: Grant Rises in the West by Kenneth P. Williams; Vicksburg by Michael B. Ballard; Nothing But Glory by Steven E. Woodworth; Vicksburg is the Key by William L. Shea. [↩]

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Posted By Eric on May 21, 2013

May 21, 1863 (Thursday)

Banks: Now! Now is much better!

Despite his wayward campaign through western Louisiana, Nathaniel Banks was back. He may have undertaken what General-in-Chief Henry Halleck had called “eccentric movements” that were of “secondary importance,” all throughout April and much of May, but now he was back on track and ready to once again try to take Port Hudson.

During his previous attempt, he didn’t really do all that much. His Army of the Gulf arrived late and then sort of just retreated without a fight. But now was different, though perhaps not as different as Banks would have liked.

He had tried to convince General Grant to send him reinforcements to take Port Hudson. When that bastion fell, they would all get together and take Vicksburg. As time passed, Grant realized that he needed all the men he could get and decided not to help Banks. In Washington, Halleck and the War Department seemed to blame Banks for the whole thing. This is fairly understandable since it was Banks and not Grant who was sitting idly by and waiting for something, anything, to happen.

But now things were about to happen. Banks decided that even though things were not the kind of different he wanted, they were still different enough to once again attack Port Hudson. Since his army had been divided for these “eccentric movements,” a portion came from the north, landing at Bayou Sara, just above Port Hudson, while another portion marched from Baton Rouge, to the south. Still another division came by transport from New Orleans. All told, Banks commanded around 30,000 men.

Be ye warned! This map is much more approximate than you can ever imagine!

Opposing Banks was the Confederate garrison of only 7,200. It was commanded by General Franklin Gardner, who had spent much of late April and early May sending troops to reinforce Vicksburg. Noticing that he was quickly being surrounded, Gardner sent troops to slow down the Yankees to the north, at Bayou Sara. There was some light skirmishing here and there, with both sides adding more bodies to the flotsam.

On this date, an entire Federal Division under General Christopher Auger advanced south, but met enough resistance and Confederate artillery to stop them and force them deploy their own guns. The Rebels retreated, but only because their ammunition was low. Once resupplied, the remainder of the day turned into a running fight with charges, countercharges, flank attacks, and repulses across the board.

By the end of the day, both sides, having made successful charges, as well as tasting some surprising defeats, claimed a victory. In the end, however, Union General Auger cleared the road to Port Hudson, allowing Banks room to land the rest of his troops.

Just before the fighting to the north began in earnest, General Gardner, back in the defenses of Port Hudson, was inspecting the works. “The enemy are coming, but mark you,” he said to his men, “many a one will get to hell before he does to Port Hudson.”

Here is a photo of General Gardner’s happy face.

Gardner also received General Joe Johnston’s command to abandon Port Hudson and join him at Jackson, Mississippi. Written on the 19th, it had taken the better part of two days to reach him. Johnston wanted Gardner to “evacuate Port Hudson forthwith.” This had happened once before. Gardner had pulled out of Port Hudson, and marched a few miles before being ordered by President Jefferson Davis himself to “return to Port Hudson with 2,000 troops and hold it to the last.”

As he mulled it over, and perhaps made some preparations to obey Johnston’s command, the battle to the north picked up, and Gardner discovered that it was now probably too late. “Positive information that the enemy has a large force,” Gardner shot back,”and is moving down to cross at Bayou Sara against this place. His whole force from Baton Rouge is in my front.” And then, in what could be taken as nearly an insult to Johnston’s orders, he concluded by telling his commanding officer: “I am very weak and should be rapidly re-enforced.”

Perhaps if Banks had waited a day, or even a few hours longer, he could have taken Port Hudson without a fight. Now, it was even too late for Banks. Gardner was staying and Banks’ troops were arriving from the north and south of the Confederate stronghold. Soon, like Vicksburg to the north, it would be a siege.¹

1. Sources: Official Records, Series 1, Vol. 26, Part 2, p 9; Vol. 52, Part 2, p476; Joseph E. Johnston by Craig L. Symonds; Pretense of Glory by James G. Hollandsworth, Jr.; Port Hudson, Confederate Bastion on the Mississippi by Lawrence Lee Hewitt; The Port Hudson Campaign: 1862-1863 by Edward Cunningham. [↩]

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Posted By Eric on May 20, 2013

May 20, 1863 (Wednesday)

Johnston: You did the ONE thing I asked you not to do, Pemberton!

In the battle for Vicksburg, Mississippi, there were two very divergent and contradictory Confederate strategies at work. General John Pemberton, who had commanded the Army of Mississippi in the field while Grant’s Federals gallivanted across the state, believed that Vicksburg itself was the key. The city had to be saved, otherwise the Confederacy in the west would fall. With this in mind, he quickly retreated into the city’s defenses after being defeated at Champion Hill. This line of thought came directly from President Jefferson Davis, who told Pemberton to hold Vicksburg at any cost.

On the other hand, General Joseph Johnston, commander of the Department of Mississippi, held a counter theory. While he certainly believed Vicksburg to be an essential part of the Southern strategy, he placed a higher value upon the Army of the Mississippi itself. Cities could always be recaptured after they fell into enemy hands, he reasoned. Armies, once destroyed, could not be similarly resurrected.

Before Grant had backed Pemberton’s Army into Vicksburg, Johnston had wanted to combine his growing force, which contained brigades sent from all across the South. He and his little “Army of Relief” arrived a few days too late to save Jackson, the state capital. But even after it fell, he was daily urging Pemberton to move northeast to link up. Together, he believed, they could face down Grant’s Army.

Pemberton received Johnston’s final plea for such a movement after the Rebel Army had retired to Vicksburg. After explaining to Johnston that he understood Vicksburg “to be the most important point in the Confederacy,” Johnston acquiesced. There was no hope in convincing Pemberton otherwise. Grant’s Army had invested at least two-thirds of the Confederate lines and, by the looks of things, it was turning into a siege.

Today’s Approximate Map is heavy on the approximateness.

“I am trying to gather a force which may attempt to relieve you,” replied Johnston. “Hold out.” Immediately, Johnston set about the task. He wrote General Franklin Gardner, commanding at Port Hudson, telling him to evacuate the fort and bring his force north. After telling him that his position was “no longer valuable,” he explained that “all the troops in the department should be concentrated as soon as possible.” They were all to meet in Jackson, gather strength and sandwich Grant’s forces between the two Confederate Armies.

Pemberton’s retreating army had lost upwards of thirty cannons in their flight back into Vicksburg. Johnston wrote to Braxton Bragg, commanding the Army of Tennessee at Tuscumbia (also in Johnston’s department), hoping to obtain replacements and more cavalry.

The only message to leave Vicksburg on this date was sent from Pemberton to Johnston. Pemberton placed the number assaulting the city at no less than 60,000, though in reality it was a little over half that. “At present,” he continued, “our main necessity is musket caps. Can you send them to me by hands of couriers or citizens?” The situation was clearly growing darker with each passing day. Pemberton was admitting that within the confines of Vicksburg, his supply lines were virtually cut. Johnston’s words written the day before must have been heavy in their prophecy: “If you are invested in Vicksburg, you must ultimately surrender.”

Meanwhile, in Vicksburg, Pemberton’s troops huddled close to the ground as Union artillery “plowed up our works considerably and dismounted tow guns on the center.” Enemy sharpshooters played along the works on the Confederate left, picking off anyone who was daft enough to poke his head above the embrasures.

Morale, as was usual of late in Pemberton’s Army, was down, but the men were encouraged by the rumors that Johnston was nearby with a large force, ready to rescue them.

Pemberton: It’ll all be okay, Joe. Just send me men, guns, ammunition, food, and supplies.

Over the next week or so, more and more troops would stream into Johnston’s ranks, swelling his forces to nearly 23,000 men. But so too were reinforcements streaming towards Grant, whose numbers would quickly reach 77,000. Until then, Pemberton would continue to plead for reinforcements and supplies, and Johnston would continue to search for troops, counting upon General Gardner at Port Hudson to join him at Jackson.

Gardner, however, was having his own problems in the shape of the Union Army of the Gulf under General Nathaniel Banks. Following his strange romp through western Louisiana, Banks had finally decided to attack Port Hudson. He had previously tried and failed, but now was different. The Confederate bastion had already been weakened by sending troops to Pemberton.

Banks had divided his army in half, and now he was trying to unite it at Port Hudson. While he accompanied one wing from Alexandria, Louisiana, down the Mississippi towards the Confederate stronghold, the other wing was marching north from Baton Rouge. On this date, Gardner’s forces tangled with Banks’ advance troops near Bayou Sara, north of the Confederate stronghold.

General Johnston’s orders to abandon Port Hudson had not yet reached him. In a few more hours, it could all be too late.¹

1. Sources: Official Records, Series 1, Vol. 24, Part 3, p892, 896, 899, 902, 903; Joseph E. Johnston by Craig L. Symonds; Vicksburg by Michael B. Ballard; Pretense of Glory by James G. Hollandsworth, Jr.; Port Hudson, Confederate Bastion on the Mississippi by Lawrence Lee Hewitt. [↩]

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Posted By Eric on May 19, 2013

May 19, 1863 (Tuesday)

General Grant rightly believed it had been a rout. The Rebels under John Pemberton were divided and thrown back at Champion Hill, and then soundly thrashed the next day at Big Black River Bridge. In their short tramp to the defenses of Vicksburg, Pemberton’s Confederates shed stragglers in droves. They were scooped up by Grant’s pursuit and seemed, by all reasoning, to be completely demoralized.

Union assault upon Vicksburg

Arriving before the parapets of Vicksburg the day before, Grant resolved to his the Rebels quickly, taking away any chance they had to reinforce or bolster their defenses. But first, his army must eat. Since the beginning of May, they had been living off the land. It had been tenuous at best. Now, with a new supply line set up across the Yazoo River north of Vicksburg, the army could once again feed itself.

Grant’s Army had invested the Confederate left and center with its three corps. This was by design. If any help was to come to Pemberton, it was come from Joe Johnston’s hovering force in the northeast. If Pemberton tried to escape, he would attempt to break out and head to the northeast. And so, with William Tecumseh Sherman on the right, James McPherson in the center and John McClernand on the left, the Army of the Tennessee had effectively backed the Confederate Army of the Mississippi up against its namesake river.

But investing wasn’t enough. Grant wanted to put an end it. While his Army was resupplying, he ordered the assault to begin at 2pm. Moving into position in time, however, was a near impossibility. Many of Sherman’s XV Corps were set, but for McPherson’s XVII Corps and especially McClernand’s XIII Corps, deep ravines had to be crossed, ridges had to be scaled and thick underbrush had to be waded. Slowly, they crept towards the Confederate works as the enemy artillery began to find its mark. By 2pm, very few of McClernand’s men were where they were supposed to be, and McPherson’s Corps was about 1000 very difficult yards from the Rebel lines.

Today’s Approximate Map is full of approximateness.

Only Sherman’s troops were ready to step off when the signal was given for the assault to begin. Grant’s plan for a simultaneous, all out attack, was crushed before it began. But it began anyway.

Before Sherman’s men was a strong point in the Confederate lines called Stockade Redan. It was located at a sharp bend in the entrenchments. This salient allowed Sherman to hit it from two sides at once, but it was also protected by other Confederate trappings that could catch Sherman’s men in a crossfire.

Following an entire morning of artillery bombardment, Stockade Redan looked no worse for wear. At 2pm, when the assault came, it was more than ground than the Rebels that slowed them. By the time they reached the works, many of the men were exhausted. Confederate firepower did the rest.

They arrived before the works and found them towering over the troops. The Rebels and their slaves had dug a trench on the Federal side, making ladders an absolute necessity in scaling the embrasures. A look to the south showed all that neither McPherson nor McClernand was able to attack in earnest. There was nothing they could do but stay where they were.

Huddled under the Confederate works actually protected them from the enemy artillery. To retreat meant to be potentially mowed down. But they could not stay pressed against it forever. Thankfully, they had to wait only until darkness. When it came, the Rebels built fires all along the top of their escarpments in hopes of illuminating the Federals below. All it accomplished, however, was silhouetting any Confederate who moved up top, making him an easy target for entire Union regiments waiting for something to shoot at.

In reality, though quick in coming, the attacks never stood a chance. Grant wanted a quick strike, but it was too soon. His men never had time to get into position. But General Grant was undaunted. He would give it some time and try again. Maybe the Rebels weren’t as demoralized as he had first believed, but he had whipped them before and was determined to do it again.¹

1. Sources: Nothing But Victory by Steven E. Woodworth; Vicksburg by Michael B. Ballard; Grant Rises in the West by Kenneth Williams; Pemberton by John C. Pemberton. [↩]

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Posted By Eric on May 18, 2013

May 18, 1863 (Monday)

Grant looks things over.

As the beaten Confederate Army under John Pemberton streamed back into the Vicksburg defenses, General Grant was hot on their heels. He saw no reason to move otherwise. By this time, he knew that he had blocked any hope Pemberton held of joining with Joe Johnston’s troops north of Jackson. The Rebel Army was divided and Vicksburg might just be ripe for the picking.

General John McClernand’s XIII Corps was in the lead, marching west on the main road through Bovina Station. To the north, William Tecumseh Sherman’s XV Corps marched along the Bridgeport Road, angling to get between Vicksburg and the Yazoo River. There was some hope that the Rebel forces stationed along the river could be cut off, but the previous day, General Pemberton ordered them to be evacuated. James McPherson, commanding Grant’s final corps (the XVII) was close behind McClernand.

The basic plan was to assault Vicksburg as soon as possible. If he waited too long, Richmond would send more reinforcements to Johnston’s army (now only 12,000 or so strong), creating a force that wouldn’t simply have to be watched, but would have to be fought.

In Vicksburg, General Pemberton’s two battle-worn divisions (under Carter Stevenson and John Bowen) joined the two other divisions manning the defenses (under John H. Forney and Martin L. Smith). The right of the Confederate line, running from the Mississippi River to the railroad was held by Carter Stevenson’s troops, who had been badly whipped at Champion Hill. His was a large division, comprised of what amounted to five brigades. The two brigades in John Bowen’s Division, which had fought along side Stevenson’s, were held more or less in reserve. One brigade hovered in the center, while the other was just north of town.

Today’s first approximate map should look somewhat familiar.

John Forney’s Division, with two brigades, had previously covered the Yazoo River defenses and the Warrenton Batteries. Since Grant had rendered both of those positions obsolete, Pemberton reunited the division and placed its right flank upon the railroad (and thus upon Stevenson’s left). It ran almost due north before connecting to Martin Smith’s Division, which curved back towards the Mississippi River, completing the circular defenses.

But these works were hardly stout. Building up to this point, Pemberton had a very difficult time finding slave labor to construct this army’s defenses. There simply weren’t enough of his own men to complete the task. Also, he had never really expected Grant to march from the Mississippi River, all the way to Jackson, turn around and then march back to Vicksburg.

And here is what will probably be the new Approximate Map for awhile.

With many more men in the works, they could now be strengthened (and the reason why Grant wanted to take Vicksburg as soon as possible). While they were improving them, Pemberton received a message from General Johnston, ordering the abandonment of Vicksburg. His reasoning was simple. Since Pemberton had ordered the Yazoo River defenses to be abandoned, trying to hold Vicksburg was pointless.

“If, therefore, you are invested in Vicksburg,” wrote Johnston of Grant’s coming siege, “you must ultimately surrender. Under such circumstances, instead of losing both troops and place, we must, if possible, save the troops.”

Pemberton called a council of war, bringing together he four division commanders, and asked their opinion on what to do. All agreed that it was impossible to abandon Vicksburg. It would morally destroy the army.

“I have decided to hold Vicksburg as long as possible,” replied Pemberton, “with the firm hope that the Government may yet be able to assist me in keeping this obstruction to the enemy’s free navigation of the Mississippi River. I still conceive it to be the most important point in the Confederacy.”

Just as the meeting was winding down, the Union artillery opened upon Vicksburg. Their chance of escape was gone. The only direction he could have moved was northeast, and it was nearly twenty-four hours too late for that.

The guns were of General Sherman’s Corps, which was staggeringly close to the Confederate right. Grant’s two other corps were to Sherman’s right, encamped several miles away. The next day, Grant planned to strike.¹

1. Sources: Official Records, Series 1, Vol. 24, Part 3, p888, 889-890; Vicksburg by Michael B. Ballard; (Pemberton, Defender of Vicksburg by John C. Pemberton; Nothing But Victory by Steven E. Woodworth. [↩]

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Posted By Eric on May 17, 2013

May 17, 1863 (Sunday)

Pemberton waits….

General John C. Pemberton waited through the night, as Edward’s Station burned upon the eastern horizon, like some hellish perpetual sunrise. With his back to the Big Black River, fifteen miles from Vicksburg, he waited for General William Loring’s Division, which had been acting as his rear guard following the retreat from the previous day’s battle at Champion Hill.

The absence of Loring’s Division left Pemberton with two divisions in the field – one under Carter Stevenson, the other under John Bowen. Stevenson’s Division had been mauled in the previous day’s battle and was quickly being marched across the railroad bridge to the western bank. The river steamer Dot was also used as a span, her body turned sideways, with bow on one shore and stern on the other.

On the eastern banks, General Bowen was in command of the defenses, manned by about 5,000 Confederates. Situated in a concaved bend in the river, their left was anchored against the river itself, while their right held close to a lake. The defenses were good, but against General Grant’s 35,000-strong Army of the Tennessee, it was only a question of time.

Following the previous day’s battle, Grant’s Army did not really pursue until morning, and after a good night’s rest. Only two of Grant’s three corps had fought at Champion Hill (John McClernand’s and James McPherson’s). The other, under William Tecumseh Sherman, had arrived later in the night following the sacking of Jackson, Mississippi’s state capital.

Today’s approximate map might come in handy.

Grant’s only fear was that Pemberton would slip north and unite with the gathering forces under Joe Johnston, now some fifteen miles northwest of Jackson. This had been the Confederate plan all along, he believed, and so sent Sherman’s Corps on a northerly road to Bridgeport, several miles upstream, but nearly due west of Pemberton’s position at the railroad crossing. Sherman was to cross the river and continue west, placing himself upon any road that the Rebels might use to link.

Of the two corps that fought, McPherson’s, was still upon the battlefield, performing the grisly tasks so necessary after such a struggle. By the end of the day, they would be just west of Edward’s Station, a few miles distant. John McClernand’s Corps moved forward in the pre-dawn, determined to smash the Rebel defenses and capture Big Black River Bridge before it was destroyed by the retreating foe.

General Bowen, commanding the Rebel entrenchments, was mostly worried about his flanks. His center was tight and held by artillery, but his flanks were weak. In truth, his whole line was weak. Morale was gone. The center of his line was held mostly by Eastern Tennessee troops who had been conscripted. Their loyalties to the Southern cause weren’t even strong enough for them to voluntarily enlist. The fighting and retreating over the past couple of weeks had done them in. Many of Bowen’s officers, though true to the cause, were furious with Pemberton and his inability to properly command an army in the field. If Bowen was honest with himself, his division was beaten even before McClernand’s Federals arrived.

Union attack at Big Black River Bridge.

But arrive they did, and immediately attacked the center. Deploying one division, under Eugene Carr, across the rail line. McClernand threw them forward. When the other division, under Peter Osterhaus, came up, they were placed south of the rails, as Carr shifted right to cover his own flank.

As the artillery bellowed, a shell hit General Osterhaus in the leg. Wounded, he was taken to the rear and General Albert Lee, previously a brigade commander, took over. McClernand, and now Grant, who had come up to join him, could see that Bowen’s lines, though manned with few men, were strong, especially the center. They began to focus upon the Confederate left, abutted against the river.

Before this flank was a depression in the ground that could effectively hide an entire brigade. While McClernand added more troops to his line, the brigade under Mike Lawler was sent speeding across the field, under the heavy fire of Rebel artillery, to reach this depression. From there, Lawler and his men from Iowa and Wisconsin, would pour a nasty fire almost perpendicular to the Rebel lines. Soon, artillery was placed and all was ready – with the Rebels being none the wiser.

Without any more notice than the hoarsely yelled order to charge, they came, bayonets fixed and screaming like blue demons, smashing the weak Confederate left and rolling towards the center like an unfaltering wave. The Rebels broke, running for the bridge, while some of their number jumped into the swift current of the Big Black, drowning in their panic. When the rest of the Rebel line saw they were flanked, it was every man for himself. The Confederate trenches emptied, even where Union attacks were weak or nonexistent.

The remains of the Big Black River Bridge.

On the western side, two of Stevenson’s brigades guarded the crossing, acting as a rear guard, as the chaotic mob that was one Bowen’s Division, frantically clawed its way across the river. Before all of the Confederates were on the western bank, the wooden railroad bridge, which had been soaked in turpentine, was set to the torch. The otherwise innocent Dot met the same fate. Any man abandoned had to swim across. There was defeat and death, but the path Federal path to Vicksburg had been cut off.

In his continuing worry that Pemberton might turn north to link up with Johnston, Grant ordered McPherson’s Corps, still at Edward’s, to cross upriver at Amsterdam, while Sherman crossed farther up at Bridgeport. The next day, Grant would suss out Pemberton’s intentions and do whatever was needed to keep him from reaching Johnston.

John Pemberton gave up waiting for General Loring’s Division, which was, by this time, moving east toward the capital of Jackson to join with Johnston. Rumors incorrectly had it that Loring was crossing somewhere south of the now destroyed bridge.

McClernand’s men lost 39 killed, 237 wounded, and 3 missing. Though the Rebel figures were never reported, Federals tallied 1,751 Confederate prisoners and 18 guns from Bowen’s artillery.¹

1. Pemberton, Defender of Vicksburg by John C. Pemberton (not the same guy); Joseph E. Johnston by Craig L. Symonds; Personal Memoirs by Ulysses S. Grant; Vicksburg by Michael Ballard; Nothing But Victory by Steven E. Woodworth. [↩]

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Posted By Eric on May 16, 2013

May 16, 1863 (Saturday)

General Grant was roused from his slumber in Clinton, Mississippi by two men who worked for the Jackson & Vicksburg Railroad. His Army of the Tennessee had torched Jackson, the state capital, the day before and were now heading back east towards Vicksburg, following the line upon which these two gentlemen were employed. They told the Union commander that they had passed by General John Pemberton’s Confederate Army of Mississippi over the night and saw it moving east, toward Grant. They claimed it to be 25,000-strong.

Union artillery at Champion Hill.

The intelligence was, more or less, correct. Pemberton, with about 22,000, was heading east. But it wasn’t toward Grant’s Army. The idea had been to go south and get between Grant’s force, disrupting his supply line west to the Mississippi River. Unbeknown to Pemberton, however, Grant had abandoned his lines of communication in favor of living off the bounty of the land. Due to some missteps and a washed out bridge, the route taken by Pemberton’s Rebels forced them to double back upon the road to Jackson – the same road (one of three, actually) that Grant was taking west.

And so, this would be a meeting by chance. Grant believed he was moving towards Pemberton, while Pemberton believed he was moving south of Grant. That is, until the previous night when countless campfire appeared below the horizon like devilish reflected stars across the land.

Before them were three roads. The southernmost was the road to Raymond, named the Raymond Road. The northernmost, the road to Jackson, was the Jackson Road. While the road in the middle was so cleverly entitled the Middle Road. Just north of the Jackson Road was the rail line between Jackson and Vicksburg – the Jackson & Vicksburg Railroad.

The opposing forces were closest on the Raymond Road, which was where the fighting began between Confederate cavalry and troops from John McClernand’s XIII Corps (A.J. Smith’s Division). The battle escalated, drawing in Rebel infantry from William Wing Loring’s Division who had stopped for the night. Sounds of firing wafted upon the morning breezes, reaching Generals Loring and Pemberton around the same time an order from General Joe Johnston reached them.

Map of troops around 6am.

Johnston had wished to unite their respective field commands somewhere well to the north. Pemberton had disregarded this idea, choosing instead to move south. Now, with Johnston’s reiteration, and the entire Union Army apparently about to swallow him whole, he decided it wasn’t such a bad idea after all. But because of the way he countermarched the previous day, his wagon train was at the front of the line. Aside from racing the already-engaged Loring to the front of the line to cover the wagons, there was nothing he could do. Though it was looking more and more like he was already in a battle, he wrote back to Johnston telling him that he’d now follow orders.

Meanwhile, the battle wasn’t simply going away, and Loring suggested that maybe, if it wasn’t too much trouble, they should deploy. Pemberton agreed, and Loring pushed a brigade forward, down the Raymond Road, the only road they knew for sure that the Federals were upon. After a bit of prodding from the Union artillery, Loring redeployed a bit to the west, giving ground, but finding a better ridge for defense.

Sketch by Col. Slack, 47th Indiana

Slightly to the north, General John Bowen also figured that the battle was upon them and deployed upon the Middle Road to meet it. And even more to the north, Carter Stevenson, farther away from the sounds of battle, followed Pemberton’s orders to send the wagon train west towards Edward’s Station, getting it out of the way in preparation of marching north to link up with Johnston.

This was all accomplished by 9:30am. But by that time, it was too late. Union Generals McClernand and McPherson were marching at east toward the Rebels upon the Jackson and Middle Roads. McClernand’s troops (Osterhaus’ Division) made first contact with some of Stevenson’s Rebels near the Confederate left.

The Rebel line stretched only as far north as the Middle Road, leaving the Jackson Road and the prominent Champion Hill farther north unoccupied. The Federals pushed Stevenson’s skirmishers until reaching the main line, which he attempted to break. Both sides fed reinforcements into the swirling caldera, but the Confederate line held.

Sketch by Lt. Henry Otis Dwight, 20th Ohio

With the Federal attacks stymied by around 10am, Pemberton thought it a fine time to break north and meet up with Johnston. This was, of course, a ridiculous idea, but mostly because Pemberton had no idea at all that a third Federal column was coming his way via the Jackson Road.

Ridiculous or not, Pemberton tried his best. Though he knew it would leave Vicksburg uncovered – something he was warned by Jefferson Davis himself not to do – General Johnston was his direct superior and finally decided to follow his orders, effectively ignoring Vicksburg to focus upon defeating Grant’s Army.

Carter Stevenson, being the farther north, would lead the way. Prior to setting out, however, he thought that it wasn’t such a crazy notion to toss out a few cavalry detachments to scout Jackson Road and the looming Champion Hill just to the north of it (Jackson Road actually ran west towards the hill before sweeping across its southern base). Stevenson’s cavalry spied a huge column of Union infantry coming fast down the Jackson Road and reported back.

Map of troops around 2pm.

This was no good at all. In their present position, Grant’s Army could basically bypass Pemberton’s force, too far to the south. The Rebels would be cut off not only from Johnston, but from Vicksburg as well. Stevenson’s brigades were quickly redeployed, pushing farther left, until they crested the hill as the Yankees moved ever closer.

Due to General Grant’s absence (he had decided to ride with William Tecumseh Sherman’s Corps, which was just now leaving Jackson), the original Union attack along the Raymond and Middle Roads stalled. Messages took too long to cross from Grant to McClernand, and the last one the latter received told him to use caution. The same was not true with McPherson’s men on Jackson Road – the Union right.

McPherson’s attacks upon the hill were broken up not only by Stevenson’s Confederates, but by the uneven ground, scattered with ravines and thick woodlots. But the Rebel line atop Champion Hill had a flaw. The left flank was anchored to nothing, simply dangling in the open. Stevenson noticed it too and quickly added more troops, just as McPherson’s Federals began their assault.

Again stalled, the Federals regrouped and General McPherson ordered an all out assault with his two divisions at hand (Logan and Hovey) upon Champion Hill. They came like scream gales, nearly ignoring the uneven ground, sweeping up the slopes and dashing themselves against the Rebel defenses.

Overwhelmed, Stevenson’s Rebels could not stand. They broke, racing down the slopes of Champion Hill, reforming along the Jackson Road as it wound its way along the southern slope. His left now rested upon the junction of the Jackson and Middle Roads, his line running west to Baker’s Creek. But this was no line of defense. The Federals, with the momentum of rushing downhill, smashed into their lines, crushing them, and with them, the Confederate left.

The rout placed a huge gap between Pemberton’s left and the rest of his line at a time when Grant arrived upon the battlefield and began urging McClernand’s men forward, pinning down both Loring and Bowen’s Rebels. Nevertheless, Pemberton, who was beginning to lose control of not only the battle, but of hid disposition as well, insisted that Bowen throw troops to plug the gap on the left.

Champion Hill

Surprisingly, this push turned into an all out charge of Bowen’s entire division, which devastated the Federals before them and stormed up Champion Hill. They recaptured the crest and sent the Yankees running for nearly a mile, splitting the Federal lines. The cost was dear in both men and ammunition, and the latter was in short supply. With the wagon train sent far to the rear by Pemberton, Bowen had little hope at all of being resupplied.

As Pemberton, Stevenson and Bowen tried to find addition regiments to bolster their success, the Federals regrouped and counterattacked. With only a few more regiments, thought Pemberton, the line could hold. He raced to find Loring on the far right and force him to help. But Loring had problems of his own. Grant’s renewal of McClernand’s attack was keeping him busy. As Bowen’s troops moved to the left, he had to spread out. Though Pemberton never found him, Loring was able to break off and head even farther north, reforming his line at the base of Champion Hill. He was even able to rally some of Stevenson’s men.

Back atop Champion Hill, the Union counterattack was pushing Bowen’s and whatever was left of Stevenson’s Divisions back down the slopes. Seeing he was beaten, Bowen ordered a retreat, which naturally turned into a stampede. It was then Pemberton issued the order for a general retreat back to Edward’s Station. General Loring would provide cover.

Unable to use the Jackson Road, since the Federals controlled it once again, Pemberton was forced to use the Raymond Road, crossing Baker’s Creek into Edward’s Station. The battle slowed to what amounted to an artillery duel, with Loring’s guns keeping the Federal guns busy. Grant sent some of McClernand’s Corps in pursuit, but most of his men were exhausted.

Approximate Map of positions at the end of the day.

By nightfall, the retreating Rebels returned to Edward’s, but were not organized enough to hold it, and fell back to the railroad bridge across the Big Black River. So quick was the retreat that Loring was unable to keep up. And so swift was the Federal pursuit, that he was cut off. Seeing Edward’s Station ablaze, he had no way of reaching Big Black River Bridge. After a council of war, he decided to give up trying to reunite with Pemberton’s other two divisions and make haste for General Johnston’s forces somewhere to the north.

The day’s fighting was over, but from all indications, it would continue the following day. Still, Grant lost 410 killed, 1,844 wounded, and 187 missing. Though the Confederate figures were vague, Pemberton reported his losses at 381 killed, 1,018 wounded, and 2,441 missing.¹

1. Pemberton, Defender of Vicksburg by John C. Pemberton (not the same guy); Joseph E. Johnston by Craig L. Symonds; Personal Memoirs by Ulysses S. Grant; Vicksburg by Michael Ballard; Nothing But Victory by Steven E. Woodworth. [↩]

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Posted By Eric on May 15, 2013

May 15, 1863 (Friday)

Where you going, General Pemberton?

Joe Johnston was on the move north, trying to put as much distance between himself and General Grant’s Army at Jackson, Mississippi as possible. But he wasn’t just fleeing willy nilly into the night. He had a plan, and that plan was to somehow meet up with General Pemberton’s force, which was supposed to be moving east towards Clinton. The whole point was to unite and defeat Grant’s apparently divided army in detail.

In fact, late the previous night, he sent a message to Pemberton describing just that. It was all masked in broad vagueries, like “I am anxious to see a force assembled that may be able to inflict a heavy blow upon the enemy.” He also suggested that they could beat half of Grant’s army “only by concentrating.”

In his letter, Johnston again suggested that Pemberton move east and interrupt Grant’s supply line back to the Mississippi River. On the morning of this date, Johnston received a message from Pemberton (written the previous day), who had decided to move south toward Dillon rather than east as Johnston had thought best.

Upon arriving in Jackson on the 13th, Johnston ordered Pemberton to move east from Edward’s Station to Clinton. Pemberton had received this message in a timely fashion, mulled it over and decided upon a different route.

As it turned out, Pemberton had similar plans to play upon Grant’s supply line, but wanted to do it much closer to Vicksburg. Disregarding Johnston’s orders to move east, Pemberton began to march his force south. Unfortunately for both plans, Grant was no longer relying upon the Mississippi River for his sustenance, much to the chagrin of the Mississippi farmers.

Pemberton’s new plan sent Johnston into a fury. The only way that they could achieve victory was to unite. Now both Confederate forces were moving away from each other! “Our being compelled to leave Jackson makes your plans impracticable,” wrote Johnston to Pemberton after receiving the infuriating missive. “The only mode by which we can unite is by your moving directly to Clinton.” This was all well and good, but the message wouldn’t reach Pemberton until the 16th, a day after he started his march.

Though about as approximate as usual, I highly suggest you follow along with the map.

Back in Jackson, the city was in flames. William Tecumseh Sherman’s men had been let loose upon the railroad, making “Sherman neckties” as they went. Jackson had been a large supply hub, manufacturing artillery caissons, clothing, and ammunition.

The XV Corps took care of all of it. Textile factories were burned to the ground, while arsenals were raided and torched. The carriage factory, which had been converted to the production of caissons, faired no better. Even the prison, which was churning out munitions, was set ablaze, though Sherman believed that it was the prisoners themselves who did the deed.

And of course, there was general looting and pillaging. Buildings and houses of all varieties met fiery ends. Even a Catholic Church wasn’t spared. Banks, hotels, hospitals, almost everything save the state capitol itself, was decimated. While Sherman would write that the acts in Jackson “injure the morals of the troops, and bring disgrace on our cause,” he didn’t do all that much to stop it.

Meanwhile, the rest of Grant’s Army of the Tennessee was headed towards Bolton Depot. Grant figured that if Johnston was going to unite with Pemberton, he would do it there. Thanks to the intercepted message of the previous day, Grant also figured that Pemberton would follow the orders of his superior and move east to Clinton. But that’s not what Pemberton was doing at all.

Pemberton believed that moving towards Clinton was an incredibly bad idea. “Such a movement will be suicidal,” he wrote in his official report, attributing the phrase to one of his staff. Pemberton began what he called “his advance movement,” even though it wasn’t exactly advancing toward the enemy.

Say, General Sherman! Your neckties sure do fit like a dandy!

Through the mud soaked roads leading from Edward’s Ferry, three Confederate divisions slogged, hoping to cut off a supply line that Grant had severed himself over a week before. This was a full on march. Wirt Adams’ Cavalry led the way, and the infantry was followed by supply wagons, as more cavalry brought up the rear.

Pemberton wanted to take the road towards Raymond southeast, then turn off, approaching Dillon from the north. They made it as far as Baker’s Creek, which they found to be flooded. The ford was impassable and the bridge was washed away. Rather than turning around, they waited, hoping the waters would recede in short order.

But it was fairly clear that they wouldn’t, so General Loring suggested another approach. They could double back, take the road that went towards Jackson, turning off on a parallel road that led to Raymond, and then turn off again on the road to Dillon. This was a confusing mess, but there was hardly any other choice.

All went with relative smoothness until they reached the turnoff for the road that led to Raymond. There, Confederate cavalry reported a whole slew of Yankees in the area of Bolton, less than five miles away. It was past nightfall, and rather than risk bumping into whatever was out there, Pemberton ordered his advance division (under Loring) to stop where they were.

Some of the men, especially those in John Bowen’s Division, could see the Union campfires to the east and knew what was about to happen. The last division, under Carter Stevenson, marched through the night to catch up.

All the while, the Federals under McClernand and McPherson were readying themselves for a pre-dawn push west towards Edward’s Station and the incredibly out of place Confederate Army of Mississippi.¹

1. Sources: Official Records, Series 1, Vol. 24, Part 1, p51, 268-269; Part 3, p313, 882; Pemberton, Defender of Vicksburg by John C. Pemberton (not the same guy); Joseph E. Johnston by Craig L. Symonds; Personal Memoirs by Ulysses S. Grant; Vicksburg by Michael Ballard; Nothing But Victory by Steven E. Woodworth. [↩]

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