Posted By Eric on January 28, 2012

January 28, 1862 (Tuesday)

“With permission, I will take Fort Henry, on the Tennessee, and establish and hold a large camp there.”
-Brigadier-General U.S. Grant

General Grant, commander of what would soon be called the Union Army of the Tennessee, had formulated a plan to take Fort Henry, along the Tennessee River. He, along with the Navy’s Flag-Officer Andrew Foote, wired General Henry Halleck, commander of the Department of Missouri. While Grant’s telegram was strictly to the point, Foote’s explained slightly more about the program.

Foote, as well as Grant, believed that Fort Henry could “be carried with four iron-clad gunboats and troops to permanently occupy.”¹ This was not, however, a scheme concocted out of the simmering darkness.

Grant had met with General Charles Smith, who had been aboard the USS Lexington when she lobbed a few shells at Fort Henry. Smith was convinced that the fort could be taken with two gunboats. Determined to act upon this information, Grant asked General Halleck for permission to meet with him in person.

The past week had seen General Grant travel to St. Louis to meet with Halleck. There, he proposed the action to assail Fort Henry. Halleck made the meeting an uncomfortable one, and dismissed Grant as he was explaining the plan. Halleck may have refused to hear Grant out because he, General Buell, commanding in Kentucky, and General McClellan had already dreamed up a strikingly similar plan based upon the same information that Smith had given to Grant.²

Halleck, however, failed to mention this to Grant. It seems that General Halleck had no plans to allow Grant to command the operation. Leading a demonstration with orders not to bring on a battle was one thing, but a campaign towards Nashville was a horse of another color. Besides, Halleck didn’t want to step off until mid-February.

Grant knew none of this. He knew nothing except that Halleck had cut him short. When he returned to Cairo, he returned a crestfallen man.

This disposition, while bordering on severe, was short-lived. In Cairo, he could discuss the particulars of the Fort Henry situation with General Smith and Flag-Officer Foote. As they chewed upon the facts, knowing that the center of Rebel General Albert Sidney Johnston’s line through Tennessee was weakest along the Tennessee and Cumberland Rivers, they finally came to the conclusion that they must act.³

Halleck might not have given Grant much credence, but Foote and Smith both had his ear. This was when both Grant and Foote wired General Halleck. In Foote’s telegram, he specifically mentioned that he first passed the idea by General Grant, possibly bringing him back into the loop.⁴

Foote would receive his reply the following day. Grant would have to call again to gain his commander’s attention.⁵

__________________

Loring Takes His Case to Stonewall Jackson Himself

While Union forces were conspiring against Confederates in the West, Confederate officers had been conspiring against each other in the East. The complaints over General Stonewall Jackson’s Romney Expedition were beginning to pile up. General Loring, who commanded a large portion of Jackson’s army, was campaigning to be rid of Jackson and to regain his independent command.

These complaints, due mostly to their validity, had found their way to the desks of President Davis and Secretary of War Judah Benjamin. The latter wrote to Jackson’s commander, General Joe Johnston, vaguely explaining that the situation in the Shenandoah Valley needed to be looked into. Johnston, who had not yet received Benjamin’s letter and would have no idea what he was talking about anyway, wrote to Jackson on this date.

On the 21st and 24th, Jackson had written to Johnston, asking for reinforcements. Since both of those letters arrived on this date, Johnston took the opportunity to pass along a few suggestions.

Since the Romney Expedition, Jackson had moved the Stonewall Brigade to Winchester, while Loring’s three brigades remained at Romney, across a mountain range, forty miles away. Johnston urged Jackson to concentrate his force “to oppose an enemy coming from Harper’s Ferry, Williamsport, or the northwest.”

Johnston was writing his own opinions and not those of Secretary Benjamin. Johnston had received a report stating that Union forces were stirring and thought it “imprudent… to keep your troops dispersed as they now are.”

While he did not order Jackson to recombine his four brigades, he closed with a warning: “The enemy might not only prevent your concentrating, but interpose himself between us, which we must never permit.”⁶

As Johnston penned his letter to Jackson, General Loring wrote one of his own. Loring, who was conspiring with his officers to be relieved of Jackson, took his argument to the man himself. In his letter, Loring did not vent his myriad frustrations, but rather took a more logical approach.

He had an engineer whom Jackson respected, Seth M. Barton, survey the ground around Romney. Barton determined it to be an “indefensible” position for a small force such as Loring’s. General Loring passed along the report, adding his own closing arguments.

“If it is the intention to keep this command here,” argued Loring, who had once been a lawyer in the 1840s, “I am compelled to say that the force is not equal to the requirements, and I therefore respectfully but earnestly request a re-enforcement of 3,000 men to meet the immediate concentration of the enemy as well as to relieve the command of the unparalleled exposure to which they have been and are now subjected.”⁷

Jackson probably paid little mind to either the report or Loring’s deposition. There were, however, workings in Richmond that would soon grab his attention.

1. Official Records, Series 1, Vol. 7, p120, 121. [↩]
2. Grant Rises in the West; The First Year, 1861-1862 by Kenneth P. Williams, University of Nebraska Press, 1952. [↩]
3. Forts Henry and Donelson; The Key to the Confederate Heartland by Benjamin Franklin Cooling, University of Tennessee Press, 1987. [↩]
4. Official Records, Series 1, Vol. 7, p120. [↩]
5. Official Records, Series 1, Vol. 7, p121. Official Naval Records, Series 1, Vol. 22, p525. [↩]
6. Official Records, Series 1, Vol. 5, p1050. [↩]
7. Official Records, Series 1, Vol. 5, p1054-1055. [↩]

No Comments »

Posted By Eric on January 27, 2012

January 27, 1862 (Monday)

In the eyes of President Lincoln, what little forward momentum that existed in the Union war effort had been coldly swept away in the snows of January. While it was true that there was a victory in Kentucky and some stirrings in Missouri, it was clear that the Army of the Potomac, nestled into its winter camp around the capital, wasn’t budging an inch. General Ambrose Burnside’s North Carolina Expedition appeared to be stalled just off the shore. The army in West Virginia was, likewise, sleeping.

Since recovering from his illness, General George McClellan, the Union army’s general-in-chief, “found that excessive anxiety for an immediate movement of the Army of the Potomac had taken possession of the minds of the Administration.”¹ The cause of this anxiety came in two parts, and McClellan soon came to possess an anxiety all his own.

General Irvin McDowell’s plan to sidestep McClellan in his sickbed and launch a campaign towards Richmond over the same basic ground as the Manassas Campaign was first to light up the eyes of the administration as it shook the typhoid fever right out of the General. Things seemed to be moving forward until McClellan joined the meetings and refused to submit a plan of his own.

It was around that time that Lincoln fired Secretary of War Simon Cameron, appointing Edwin Stanton to the position. At first, Stanton and McClellan appeared to have much in common, especially in the realm of politics. Both were adept politicians in their own right, but Stanton was the Secretary of War, and McClellan was the commander of the army at war.

Stanton immediately whipped the War Department into shape. He was strict, disciplined and organized, and expected his army to be the same. He put an end to the multitudes of officers seeking promotions in Washington, to special favors and the other frivolities that were rampant under Simon Cameron.

Part of this new way of doing things fell hard upon McClellan, as Secretary Stanton joined the ever-growing chorus of administration officials crying for the army to move. Each attempt to convince McClellan to reveal a plan of operation was met with scorn and disbelief that mere politicians could know a thing about war.

President Lincoln quickly grew weary of McClellan’s refusal to submit a plan. He became certain that nothing would be done unless he gave a direct order for the armies to move. Finally, on this date, at the very end of his patience, President Lincoln issued such an order.²

Lincoln’s General War Order No. 1, written without the consultation of any other official, ordered that the “22nd day of February 1862 [George Washington's birthday], be the day for a general movement of the Land and Naval forces of the United States against the insurgent forces.”

He specifically mentioned the forces at Fortress Monroe, the Army of the Potomac, the army in Western Virginia, General Buell’s Army of the Cumberland in Kentucky, and General Halleck’s army under General Grant at Cairo, Il (soon to be the Army of the Tennessee). He also wanted a Naval force to be ready in the Gulf of Mexico by that date.

As for the other forces, such as the 30,000 troops under Generals Pope and Curtis in Missouri, as well as that of Col. Canby in New Mexico, Lincoln ordered them to “obey existing orders, for the time, and be ready to obey additional orders when duly given.”

In closing, Lincoln ordered “That the Heads of Departments, and especially the Secretaries of War and of the Navy, with all their subordinates; and the General-in Chief, with all other commanders and subordinates, of Land and Naval forces, will severally be held to their strict and full responsibilities, for the prompt execution of this order.”³

General McClellan’s reaction to General War Order No. 1 seems to be lost to history. In his memoirs, McClellan tells of his reaction after receiving a more specific order a few days later [which we'll get to then]. No doubt, like when he received previous requests to move, he took offense and mostly ignored it.

Surprisingly, however, it seems as if McClellan had already been working on a plan prior to receiving Lincoln’s order. McClellan, most likely after being urged to do so, met with Secretary Stanton and divulged a plan to attack Richmond via the lower Chesapeake Bay. According to a report submitted by McClellan in August of 1863, Stanton asked the General to “develop it to the President.” It seems that McClellan submitted a plan to Lincoln, possibly in writing, detailing his lower Chesapeake idea.⁴

While McClellan was drafting his paper, Lincoln was preparing a follow up order, specifically to McClellan and the Army of the Potomac. Before the month was out, Lincoln and McClellan would know each others’ true expectations.

1. Official Records, Series 1, Vol. 5, p41. [↩]
2. Abraham Lincoln: A History by John Nicolay and John Hay, American Historical Foundation, 1914. There was also some guidance from Army of the Potomac; McClellan Takes Command by Russel H. Beatie. [↩]
3. Abraham Lincoln, War Order No. 1, January 27, 1862. The Abraham Lincoln Papers at the Library of Congress. [↩]
4. Official Records, Series 1, Vol. 5, p41. [↩]

No Comments »

Posted By Eric on January 26, 2012

January 26, 1862 (Sunday)

With the Union victory at Mill Springs, General Don Carlos Buell, commander of the Department of the Ohio, was handed two opportunities. The Rebels, under General George Crittenden, had been scattered, leaving the door to Eastern Tennessee wide open but slightly defended. It also freed up General Thomas, Union commander at Mill Springs, to join the rest of the army for an advance towards Nashville.

General Thomas suggested this two-for-one deal to Buell on the 24th, nominating General Samuel Perry Carter’s brigade, made up mostly of men from Eastern Tennessee. They had been even more anxious than President Lincoln and General McClellan to march into their hometowns and come to the aide of their comrades. Finally, General Buell saw the light.

“I have ordered your brigade to return to the Cumberland Gap route,” opened Buell to Carter, in a letter ordering him to Eastern Tennessee. He was to select four regiments, some cavalry and take four pieces of artillery to, “by a prompt movement, seize and hold Cumberland Gap, fortifying yourself strongly.”

Though Buell was hesitant to tell Carter how to fight, he warned him against extensive operations, “unless the enemy is weaker than is probable.” The only specific detail mentioned by Buell was “the destruction of the railroad line through Tennessee.” He warned that hitting the railroad “must be done by management or the rapid movement of a small force, rather than by any movement of your main force.”

Buell’s reluctance to enter Eastern Tennessee was due to a disagreement with Lincoln and McClellan concerning overall strategy in the west. It was not that he didn’t care about the Unionists in the region. With their sufferings in mind, he closed his letter, warning Carter that his men were “to refrain from any unnecessarily harsh course” towards the Rebel authorities. Buell was worried of “increased persecution of the loyal people by way of retaliation.”

“Restrain your troops from committing outrages upon persons or property, and make no arrests, unless of those who are engaged in war against your command or who are otherwise working actively against its comfort or safety.”¹

General Buell also wrote to General Thomas, Carter’s commander, with the specific instructions to send the brigade to London, Kentucky, roughly sixty miles north of Cumberland Gap. He was to supply them with “three days’ rations in haversacks and five in wagons.” Buell also wanted the brigade to “move as rapidly as possible, without absolutely forcing their march.”

There was, however, a small snag. In his reply, General Thomas told Buell that only two days’ rations could be procured. “The subsistence stores are still behind and come in very slowly,” explained Thomas. Carter’s Brigade would have to wait a couple of days before starting out.²

__________________

Richmond Stirs at Stonewall’s Conduct

While the Union attempted to take advantage of the situation in the west, the Confederates were busy battling each other in the east. Due to the way that they felt their troops had been treated by General Stonewall Jackson, eleven officers in General Loring’s Army of the Northwest, attached to Jackson’s command for the Romney Expedition, vented their disgust in a letter.

Addressed to Loring, it urged the General to approach the War Department to see if the entire command, currently stationed in Romney, could be wrested from the authority of Stonewall Jackson. Loring, who was equally disgusted, not only approved their letter, he added his own post-script.

Loring assured the Secretary of War, to whom it was forwarded, that everything written was true. “I am most anxious to re-enlist this fine army, equal to any I ever saw,” added Loring, “and am satisfied if something is not done to relieve it, it will be found impossible to induce the army to do so, but with some regard for its comfort, a large portion, if not the whole, may be prevailed upon.”³

Basically, Loring was stating that if he and his men weren’t returned to independent command, his men would not re-enlist once their terms of service were up.

A letter, however, wasn’t the only thing that General Loring was sending to Richmond. He also sent General William Taliaferro to hand-deliver the letter which he co-authored to President Davis himself. He would arrive in the capital in a couple of days.⁴

While it would take some time for Taliaferro to reach Richmond, rumors of the situation in Romney had already reached Davis. On or near this date, Col. Albert Rust, a veteran of the Battle of Cheat Mountain who had received praise from Jackson during the recent operations around Bath, requested a transfer from President Davis. He wanted to be rid of Jackson, who he referred to as “that crazy preacher who marched us up and down the icy mountains to no purpose.” Davis did not grant Rust’s request, but that doesn’t mean he ignored the problem with Jackson entirely.⁵

“The accounts which have reached us of the condition of the army in the Valley District fill us with apprehension,” wrote Secretary of War Judah Benjamin to General Joe Johnston, Jackson’s superior. Davis was requesting, through Benjamin, that Johnston look into the case and “take such measures as you think prudent under the circumstances, and report to the Department whether any measures are necessary on its part to restore the efficiency of that army, said to be seriously impaired.”⁶

Johnston, who knew nothing about the Loring-Jackson debates, would soon send an inspector to see what was going on. It must have seemed trifling at the time as he had just been informed that General P.G.T. Beauregard, his second in command, was being transfered to Tennessee.

Beauregard had informed Johnston in passing the previous day, but it wasn’t official until the letter from the Secretary of War arrived. While Beauregard’s quick note stated that he would return shortly to Virginia, Secretary Benjamin’s letter made no mention at all of Beauregard’s return. Johnston’s job was about to get much, much more difficult. ⁷

1. Official Records, Series 1, Vol. 7, p566-567. [↩]
2. Official Records, Series 1, Vol. 7, p567. [↩]
3. Official Records, Series 1, Vol. 5, p1048. [↩]
4. Stonewall Jackson by James I. Robertson. [↩]
5. Shenandoah 1862 by Peter Cozzons. [↩]
6. Official Records, Series 1, Vol. 5, p1049. [↩]
7. Official Records, Series 1, Vol. 5, p1050. [↩]

No Comments »

Posted By Eric on January 25, 2012

January 25, 1862 (Saturday)

Despite the warnings from his friends, General Pierre Gustav Toutant Beauregard had accepted President Davis’ invitation to leave his command under General Joe Johnston near Manassas, and take up a new command under General Albert Sidney Johnston in Tennessee. The previous day, Roger Pryor, acting as liaison between the President and Beauregard, had asked the General “May I tell President you will go?” before adding his encouragement, “Say go.”

Beauregard, who had already made up his mind, said “go.” Actually, he said, “Yes, I will go. May God protect our cause.”

To his commander, General Joe Johnston, he said, “I have received a telegram from Pryor which says I must go temporarily to Columbus. Much fear is entertained of the Mississippi Valley. I have authorized him to say Yes. I will be back here as soon as possible.”

Beauregard most definitely believed that was true. He believed that he would take care of business in the west and return to Virginia for the spring campaign. Pryor, assuming President Davis would go along with it, had promised him as much.

He was also assured that the army in the west had 70,000 men. In reality, it had around 45,000. Beauregard probably didn’t fully accept that figure, but he was promised that he would be reinforced with enough men to launch an offensive campaign.

General Beauregard was not ordered to the west. He went willingly and, in all likelihood, would probably not have been ordered west by Davis. He was, however, deceived into taking the position. He went west believing he would be given the troops he wanted and would soon come back east. With those lies taken to heart, Beauregard prepared to leave for Nashville.¹

__________________

Jackson’s Eleven Angry Men

Stonewall Jackson had left three brigades under General Loring in the dismal hole of Romney [now in West Virginia], thirty miles west of Winchester. Infuriated at how Loring’s troops were treated, Samuel V. Fulkerson, colonel of the 37th Virginia, wrote to two Virginia congressmen on the 23rd, hoping to get Loring’s troops from under Jackson’s command. He had even managed to convince his brigade commander, General William Taliaferro, to endorse it.

Two days later, on this date, Fulkerson and Taliaferro had convinced nine other high-ranking officers to sign a letter to General Loring, explaining their condition. Loring, of course, knew very well of their condition as he had been witness to it since he and his command arrived in Winchester in late December.

The letter to Loring was nearly identical to Fulkerson’s letter to the Virginia congressmen, with one important difference. In his letter to the congressmen, Fulkerson asked if they could “impress these considerations upon” the President and Secretary of War. When addressing General Loring, eleven officers asked him to “present the condition of your command to the War Department, and earnestly ask that it may be ordered to some more favorable position.”²

A couple of congressmen asking for a favor meant little when compared to the commander of the Army of the Northwest asking the President to look towards the welfare of his men.

General Loring would receive and act upon the letter the next day.

1. The Military Operations of General Beauregard in the War Between the States, Vol. 1, by Alfred Roman. [↩]
2. Official Records, Series 1, Vol. 5, p1041; 1047. [↩]

No Comments »

Posted By Eric on January 24, 2012

January 24, 1862 (Friday)

Though several months had passed since the October 1st meeting between President Davis and Confederate Generals Johnston, Beauregard and G.W. Smith, little of note had transpired within the Rebel camp between Manassas and Washington.

During the meeting, all three generals stood united as they proposed Beauregard’s plan to invade Maryland and force McClellan’s Army of the Potomac out into the open. Davis liked the plan, but shot it down for want of troops.

In complete disgust and believing that the Rebel army wouldn’t move until spring, General Beauregard asked to be reassigned to New Orleans. The request was denied. He was needed in Virginia.

From there, the relationship between Davis and Beauregard slowly deteriorated. Beauregard took issue with Secretary of War Judah Benjamin, and when Davis tried to step in, Beauregard took issue with him.

All went completely sour when Beauregard submitted his final report on the Battle of Manassas. The long, rambling, 9,000 word document blamed President Davis for not allowing the Confederate army to pursue the fleeing Yankees. Beauregard also asserted that prior to the battle, he submitted a written plan of operation. When Davis, who asserted that Beauregard never submitted any plan, finally read it, he was livid. He accused Beauregard of engaging in self-exultation at the expense of the President.

The controversy was enough for the Confederate Congress to order Davis to provide the reports of battles not yet submitted to the legislature. A month and a half later, this task was completed.

The submitted reports included Beauregard’s report of Manassas complete with annotations and corrections by President Davis. Many of the notes denied that Beauregard submitted a plan of operation. Ultimately, a compromise was reached between the supporters in Congress of Davis and Beauregard. The report would be officially published, but it would be printed without Davis’ illustrations.

It was then, in early January, that the Davis administration began looking for ways to send Beauregard to the west. Some of the President’s supporters approached a few of Beauregard’s supporters, placing the bug in their ears. Somehow, it seemed like the best solution for everyone.

When Beauregard was approached on the subject, he appears to have encouraged the idea. He was offered a position under General Albert Sidney Johnston, commanding in Kentucky and Tennessee (though mostly the latter). Beauregard would be assigned the left wing, headquartered at Columbus, along the Mississippi, the command of General Polk. He was told by Roger Pryor, the supporter in Congress with whom Beauregard regularly communicated, that General A.S. Johnston had 70,000 men, and that there were 30,000 at Columbus (in reality, Johnston had roughly 45,000).

After a bit of consideration, Beauregard agreed to accept it (if officially offered) under the condition that the western army be reinforced to the point where it could begin offensive operations. Also, he wanted it in writing that he could return to Virginia once his work was finished in Tennessee.¹

Throughout the early part of this week (January 20th, etc.), Beauregard was bombarded by telegrams from his supporters. Some wished for him to accept the position, others wanted him to stay in the east.

General Robert Toombs, former US senator from Georgia, urged Beauregard to stay, telling him that he would explain why when he saw him next. The following day, Beauregard wired back, that he would like Toombs to “explain as soon as possible. I am anxious to do for the best.”²

Unable to see Beauregard in person, General Toombs composed a brief letter explaining how he saw the proposal. First, Toombs tried to conjure Beauregard’s sense of honor, expressing that the “line of the Potomac is by far the most important in the contest. It is at that point, by strong and energetic movements, we will be compelled to disentangle ourselves from our present difficulties. I consider your presence there as of the highest possible importance to the success of these movements.”

And then Toombs became woefully pragmatic. “You will not be ordered away,” he wrote, indicating that if Beauregard wanted to stay in the east, he could, “but, once away, you would not, in my opinion, be ordered back.” If Beauregard went west, leveled Toombs, he would stay in the west for the rest of the war.³

As Toombs was composing his letter, Beauregard was finishing one of his own:

I am a soldier of the cause and of my country, ready, at this juncture and during this war, to do duty cheerfully wheresoever placed by the constituted authorities; but I must admit that I would be most reluctant to disassociate my fortunes from those of this army, and unwilling to be permanently separated from men to whose strong personal attachment for and confidence in me I shall not affect blindness. In view, however, of the season, and of the bad condition of the country for military operations, I should be happy to be used elsewhere, if my services are considered at all necessary for the public good, whether on the Mississippi or at any other threatened point of the Confederate States.⁴

The letters were written on January 23. On this date (the 24th), they must have crossed paths. Beauregard probably received Toombs’ letter and read it, understanding that it was now rendered moot. It was clear, however, that Beauregard’s friends in Congress had not yet received his letter.

Roger Pryor, Beauregard’s supporter in Congress, wired the General:

Don’t think Toombs’s objections valid. Your letter not received. May I tell President you will go? Say go.⁵

1. In writing this summary of the autumn of 1861, I drew upon P.G.T. Beauregard; Napoleon in Gray by T. Harry Williams as well as The Military Operations of General Beauregard in the War Between the States, Vol. 1, by Alfred Roman. [↩]
2. P.G.T. Beauregard to Robert Toombs, January 20, 1862. As printed in The Military Operations of General Beauregard in the War Between the States, Vol. 1, by Alfred Roman. [↩]
3. Robert Toombs to P.G.T. Beauregard, January 23, 1862. As printed in The Military Operations of General Beauregard in the War Between the States, Vol. 1, by Alfred Roman. [↩]
4. P.G.T. Beauregard to Roger Pryor, January 23, 1862. As printed in The Military Operations of General Beauregard in the War Between the States, Vol. 1, by Alfred Roman. [↩]
5. Roger Pryor to P.G.T. Beauregard, January 24, 1862. As printed in The Military Operations of General Beauregard in the War Between the States, Vol. 1, by Alfred Roman. [↩]

1 Comment »

Posted By Eric on January 23, 2012

January 23, 1862 (Thursday)

To most of the South, Stonewall Jackson had completed his mission. And on paper, perhaps he did. He had marched his army from Winchester, tormented the Yankees at Hancock, Maryland and then took Romney without a fight. But left out of that seemingly simple operation were the privations and sufferings of his men.

Few then knew of their bloody and icy march from Hancock or their struggle to even march into Romney. And on this date, when the Stonewall Brigade left Romney for Winchester, leaving General Loring’s three brigades behind, few, apart from the soldiers, knew what was truly being left behind.

In the week or so that they occupied the town, Loring’s men grew to despise General Jackson and his beloved brigade. While the boys of the Stonewall Brigade could ridicule their leader from dawn till dusk, whenever Loring’s men uttered a word of contempt about Ol’ Jack, a fist fight would break out.

As they marched from Romney, through the dismal dark, with clouds promising snow, no one shed a tear. The Stonewall Brigade was happy to leave this miserable hole, while Loring’s troops were happy to be rid of “Jackson’s Lambs.”

They were not, however, happy to be in Romney. The town, which had changed hands several times already, was a shell of its former self. One Virginia private wrote that Romney looked “very much as if it had been visited by an earthquake and pretty well shaken to pieces.” The odor of rotting meat mixed with raw sewage as it flowed through the streets in “shin-deep mud.”

Loring’s men were, not surprisingly, filthy. “I think I am dirtier than I ever was before, and may be lousy besides,” wrote another private to his wife. “I have not changed clothes for two weeks…. I am afraid the dirt is sticking in, as I am somewhat afflicted with the baby’s complaint – a pain under the apron.”

General Loring himself was furious at Jackson and didn’t much care who knew it. Romney, he thought, had little strategic value, was indefensible and would be his ruin.¹

So far, few knew how General Loring’s men of the Army of the Northwest had suffered at the hands of Jackson. This, hoped Samuel V. Fulkerson, colonel of the 37th Virginia, was about to change. On this date, he wrote to two Virginia congressmen, hoping to pry Loring’s troops from Jackson’s command.

He told of their “terrible exposure since leaving Winchester,” and how their “emaciated force” was reduced to “almost a skeleton.” He explained how holding Romney was pointless as “the country around it has been exhausted by the enemy, and its proximity to the enemy and the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad will wear us away (already greatly reduced) by heavy picket and guard duty.”

Fulkerson was convinced that if they had been ordered to Winchester, he could have raised 500 additional recruits. If they were to stay in Romney, they could raise none while the men suffered and died throughout the long winter.

General Taliaferro, Fulkerson’s brigade commander, added a post script confirming that all the Colonel said was true. The wheels, they hoped, had now begun to turn, pulling them from the mud of Romney.²

__________________

Victory at Mill Springs Gives Buell a Two-For-One Deal

Since he learned of the victory at the Battle of Mill Springs, Union General Don Carlos Buell, commander of the Department of the Ohio (Kentucky and Tennessee), was anxious to bag the fleeing Rebels. On the 21st, two days after the battle, Buell wrote to General George Thomas, commanding the Union troops in the field, ordering him to somehow cross the swollen Cumberland River and occupy Monticello with a brigade, a mere ten miles southwest. Buell reiterated his sentiments the next day, and on this day, Thomas replied.

While taking Monticello would be relatively easy, holding it would be impossible. This wasn’t because of some large Rebel force in the area, but because “it would be impossible to subsist a large force” in and around the town. The roads were impassible and the river uncrossable.

Thomas had a plan of his own. With the Rebels sent fleeing, he wanted to operate with the rest of the army at Mumfordville against the Confederates under General William Hardee at Bowling Green. He suggested the town of Burkesville, about forty miles downstream and seventy miles east of Bowling Green. To appease his men of Eastern Tennessee, he again brought up the plan the General McClellan and President Lincoln had been pushing Buell to accept.

Since the Rebels that had been guarding the door to Eastern Tennessee had been scattered, “General Carter’s brigade might go to encourage the citizens and to take them arms and ammunition.” Thomas did not believe that “any stronger force will be needed, especially if Middle-Tennessee is threatened by my force.”³

Thomas, with his victory at Mill Springs, was offering Buell the chance to appease McClellan and Lincoln, while still advancing on Nashville with the bulk of his army.

__________________

Lincoln Wants the Mortar Boats

President Lincoln, while pushing for an advance into Eastern Tennessee, was also pushing for other things for the war effort in the west. One of those things was the use of mortar boats.⁴

For the past few days, Flag Officer Andrew Foote, commander of the Union Naval forces in the western Rivers, had been debating the merits of using mortar boats against the Rebel Forts Henry and Donelson on the Tennessee and Cumberland Rivers.

In favor of the mortars was Lt. Todd Phelps, commander of the USS Conestoga. Though he brought up some smashingly good points, Foote still believed that towing the heavy boats up the swift current was not feasible.

On this date, however, the decision was made. President Lincoln, who probably knew little of the friendly debate between Foote and Phelps, promised Henry Wise, of the Navy Bureau of Ordnance: “Now I am going to devote a part of every day to these mortars and I wont leave off until it fairly rains Bombs.”⁵

Wise deftly relayed the message to Foote and then another with a more direct order. “The President directs me to inform you that he wishes the rafts and mortars and all their appointments to be got ready at the earliest possible moment,” informed Wise.⁶ Attached to another telegram, Wise added: “The President wishes the rafts with their 13 inch mortars and all appointments to be ready for use at the earliest possible moment. What can we do here to advance this? What is lacking? What is being done, so far as you know? Telegraph us every day, showing the progress, or lack of progress in this matter.”⁷

Before the day was out, Foote dispatched an officer named Captain Constable to Pittsburgh to ascertain “the number of mortars and beds ready to be sent here.” He was then to stop off in Cincinnati to check on the gun powder needed for the mortars.⁸

And just that quickly, the debate was at an end.

1. As I’ve been doing with the entire Romney Campaign, I’ve drawn from three books: Shenandoah 1862 by Peter Cozzens, Stonewall Jackson by James I. Robertson, and Stonewall in the Valley by Robert G. Tanner. [↩]
2. Official Records, Series 1, Vol. 5, p1041. [↩]
3. Official Records, Series 1, Vol. 7, p563-564. [↩]
4. Mortar boats were simply boats with a mortar on board. They had no means of propulsion and had to be towed or floated to wherever they were needed. [↩]
5. As related in a telegram from Henry Wise to Andrew Foote, January 23, 1862, as found in the Gilher-Lehrman Collection, GLC04702.02. [↩]
6. Official Naval Records, Series 1, Vol. 22, p516. [↩]
7. Henry Wise to Andrew Foote, January 23, 1862, as found in the Electronic Text Center, University of Virginia Library. [↩]
8. Official Naval Records, Series 1, Vol. 22, p518. [↩]

No Comments »

Posted By Eric on January 22, 2012

January 22, 1862 (Wednesday)

Since learning of the defeat of General George Crittenden’s Rebels at Mill Springs, General Albert Sidney Johnston was in a near panic. With only 2,000 or so Southern soldiers at Cumberland Gap, there was little stopping Union General Buell from advancing. While the defeat was a major blow to stopping the Union from entering Eastern Tennessee, his eyes were turned towards the center of the state.

Johnston suspected that Buell’s true objective was Nashville. He knew that Union forces were slowly closing in on him from the north. Though the winter roads were mired in thick mud, he ordered General Hardee in Bowling Green to detach General John Floyd’s brigade (and a bit of another) to cut off the Union advance from the north at Russelville, KY.¹

The Union advance was commanded by General Thomas Crittenden, brother of the recently-defeated Rebel general.² Buell had ordered Crittenden, with two brigades, to stay north of the Green River near Calhoun. However, unable to find defensible ground, he violated the spirit of the order and crossed the Green at South Carrollton. There, he found good ground rising 150 feet above the valley.³

It was this movement that created the stirring in Confederate Albert Sidney Johnston, but it was not the only thing on his mind.

From the west, General Ulysses Grant had just completed a diversion in western Kentucky that he and his commander, General Henry Halleck, hoped would aid General Buell in launching the advance that never came in Eastern Tennessee. The diversion was to hold the Rebel troops in western Kentucky, stopping them from reinforcing their comrades in the east. This was successful, but Buell did nothing to take advantage of it.

Grant advertised that his ruse was headed towards Forts Henry and Donelson, and Johnston believed it. The Federal advance was in two columns. The first, under General McClernand, was, by this date, already back at their base in Cairo, IL. The other, under General Smith, was at Callowaytown on the Tennessee River, just above Fort Henry. To cover Fort Henry, Johnston sent two regiments of reinforcements and hoped for more from New Orleans.

Putting all of this together, Johnston reasoned that the ultimate objective was Nashville. The Union force from the north, under General Thomas Crittenden, and the force of General Grant’s from the east were working in concert, believed Johnston, both cruising towards Nashville. To cut off Grant, Johnston moved 8,000 troops to Clarksville, TN, 100 miles northwest of Nashville.⁴

Two days prior, General Henry Halleck, Union commander in Missouri, mused that if both Grant and Buell (via Crittenden) were to move on Nashville simultaneously, it would be a recipe for disaster, as they would be operating on converging exterior lines. This, however, was exactly what Johnston believed was happening.⁵

Basically, Confederate General Albert Sidney Johnston was nearly certain that the Union army was way more organized than it actually was.

Johnston also predicted that there would be no action in Missouri for the near future, and that McClellan would wait till spring before doing anything in Virginia. While he was saying this in a letter to Richmond in hopes of getting more troops, he was correct about McClellan. About Missouri, however, General Henry Halleck would do his best to prove Johnston wrong.⁶

__________________

Foote Still Doesn’t Want To Use The Mortar Boats

General Halleck, in his attempt to do something, anything, to dislodge the Rebels under General Johnston from western Kentucky and Tennessee, was now seriously considering an attack up the Tennessee and/or Cumberland Rivers. These rivers led to the heartland of Tennessee and the doorway to Nashville. Guarding these rivers, however, were two forts, Henry and Donelson.

Fort Henry, along the Tennessee River, was the closest to the left wing of Halleck’s command, under General Grant. During his diversion, Grant sent a brigade under General Charles Smith to the Tennessee River. Once he reached the river, his brigade rested and received supplies.

On this date, realizing that it would take some time for his men to be resupplied, he decided to hitch a ride on the USS Lexington to see Fort Henry for himself.

As the Lexington steamed to within two and a half miles of the fort, they saw two small Rebel steamers quickly chuff away. Drawing nearer, the Lexington fired several shots at the fort, which replied with a single shot that fell about a half mile short.

While firing upon the fort, General Smith was overcome by a sense of optimism. Though he believed that there were up to 3,000 men in the fort (a very accurate guess, as it turned out), he was sure that “two iron-clad gunboats would make short work” of Fort Henry.⁷

Meanwhile, General Halleck, Flag Officer Andrew Foote and Lt. Todd Phelps of the USS Conestoga continued their debate over how best to reduce the forts. The previous day, Foote, who commanded all of the ships in the western waters, argued that the use of mortar boats on the Tennessee and Cumberland Rivers would make little difference. Phelps, who commanded only a single vessel, believed “an efficient mortar boat would be worth a gunboat in the reduction of Fort Henry.”

After reading and considering all the reasoning that Lt. Phelps could put to paper, Foote was still unimpressed. While he admitted that Phelps “frequently run up the Tennessee and Cumberland rivers,” and thus knew them well, he also asserted that “the difficulty of towing boats of their construction against the strong current” was the primary reason that he did not “consider it feasible to attempt to take the mortar boats up these rivers.”⁸

Lt. Phelps, however, wasn’t the only one who wanted to use the mortar boats. Washington, especially President Lincoln, was excited to see them in action.

1. Official Records, Series 1, Vol. 7, p844. [↩]
2. George and Thomas Crittenden were the only two brothers to serve as generals on opposing sides of the conflict. [↩]
3. Official Records, Series 1, Vol. 7, p558. [↩]
4. Official Records, Series 1, Vol. 7, p845. [↩]
5. Official Records, Series 1, Vol. 8, p508-511. [↩]
6. Official Records, Series 1, Vol. 7, p845. [↩]
7. Official Records, Series 1, Vol. 7, p73-73; 561. [↩]
8. Official Naval Records, Series 1, Vol. 22, p514. [↩]

1 Comment »

Posted By Eric on January 21, 2012

January 21, 1862 (Tuesday)

General Ulysses Grant and a band of 15,000 had spent the better part of a week making a diversion in western Kentucky. The object was to keep the Rebels in the western portion of the state from reinforcing those in the eastern portion. This was done so General Buell in Louisville could launch a campaign into Eastern Tennessee. However, while Grant easily attained his objective, Buell gave little thought to acting in concert with him.

Though rendered pointless, Grant’s expedition wasn’t fruitless. General Charles Smith commanded a brigade under Grant that, on this date, was still on the march. Another brigade, commanded by General John McClernand, had returned to their base at Cairo, Illinois.

For Smith’s and McClernand’s men alike, the past week had been one of rain, ice, mud and hunger. They had marched at least seventy-five miles through a quagmire of roads as the temperatures dropped to near freezing. In their hunger, some soldiers even tried to make off with a horse.

But while McClernand’s men were settling back into their camps at Cairo, Smith’s brigade was on the road to Callaway, Kentucky, along the Tennessee River, seventy miles southwest of Cairo. Though the roads to the small river town were even worse than the typical Kentucky road in January, they finally made it to the banks of the Tennessee.

There, they found the USS Lexington, a gunboat armed with six pieces of heavy artillery. The Lexington, along with a steamer named the Wilson, had met Smith’s brigade to resupply the troops. There they learned that the Lexington had engaged a small Rebel vessel, but it had quickly scurried away after a short exchange. After the encounter, the Lexington threw twelve rounds into the fort and withdrew back to Callaway.

After hearing this report, General Smith must have made up his mind to see the fort for himself. The next morning, he and several of his staff planned to go with the Lexington for another sortie to Fort Henry.¹

Fort Henry wasn’t the only Rebel fort in western Tennessee. Her sister, Fort Donelson, was twelve miles east, along the Cumberland River. The USS Lexington wasn’t the only ship on the waters casing the forts. The USS Conestoga, commanded by Lt. Seth Phelps, had taken a few peeks at Fort Donelson.

On this date, Phelps, his commander Flag Officer Andrew Foote, and General Henry Halleck, overall department commander, were debating the use of mortar boats against the forts. Mortar boats were simply boats with a mortar on board. They had no means of propulsion and had to be towed or floated to wherever they were needed.

Flag Officer Foote didn’t think the mortar boats were suited to the Tennessee and Cumberland Rivers. The gunboats, like the Lexington and Conestoga, believed Foote, would be all that was needed to reduce the forts. He also had another concern. The mortar boats were constructed of heavy timber and would have to be towed up the swollen rivers, rather than floated down.

Lt. Phelps, on the other hand, believed the mortar boats to be well worth the trouble. “The gunboats will fire to great disadvantage,” reasoned Phelps in a letter to Halleck, “as the walls are much higher than the guns of the boats. If the shot lodges in the embankment it does no harm.” A mortar, on the other hand, lobs its shells up and over the parapets of the fort, “leaving no safety behind the walls.”

Unlike Foote, Phelps believed “that an efficient mortar boat would be worth a gunboat in the reduction of Fort Henry, but the mortar must be well worked.” Of Fort Donelson, he believed it “favorable for the greatest effect of bombshells, both in and about it. Effective mortar boats must prove the most destructive adversaries earth forts can have to contend with.”

Phelps’ letter, filled with sound strategic advice and encouragement was sent to both Halleck and Foote, who would respond the following day.²

1. Official Records, Series 1, Vol. 7, p72-73. [↩]
2. Official Naval Records, Series 1, Vol. 22, p511-514. [↩]

No Comments »

Posted By Eric on January 20, 2012

January 20, 1862 (Monday)

Unknown to Union General Thomas, the Rebels under General Crittenden had escaped under darkness, across the Cumberland River, into southern Kentucky. In the lonely moments before dawn, the last of the Confederates landed on the southern banks and burned the steamer used to ferry them across.

As the morning broke, Thomas arrayed his division to take what he believed were 4,000 well-entrenched Rebels. They advanced in good order with the 10th Kentucky in front, skirmishers deployed. The skirmishers were the first to see that the Rebels had fled across the river.

As the rest of the division entered the Confederate works, Company A of the 10th Kentucky made it to the ferry site just in time to see a band of Rebels on a hill across the river. A few shots were exchanged, and one of the Union soldiers believed he killed a Confederate, but at that range, there was little danger.¹

The spoils of the battle were hastily left behind by Crittenden’s flight. Eleven or twelve pieces of artillery, a wagon of ammunition, a thousand horses, commissary stores and camp equipment all fell into Thomas’ hands. Though he could not cross the river, as the Rebels had burned the boats, he realized the extent of his victory.²

General Crittenden was also realizing its extent. The loss of artillery and ammunition, while dear, was not an immediate threat to life. Even the horses and wagons could be replaced. The commissary stores, however, were a disastrous loss. In winter, living off the land was simply impossible. To survive, he would have to march his army eighty miles down the river to Gainesborough, Tennessee, abandoning Kentucky to the Federals. By the evening of this date, the Rebels had made it to Monticello, Kentucky, ten miles from their camp.³

Meanwhile, nine miles north, where the Battle of Mill Springs raged for three bloody hours the previous day, over 200 dead bodies were strewn about the fields and woodlots. The Union dead were gathered and buried inside their camps in individual graves, while the Rebels were buried in unmarked, shallow pits near where they fell.

The body of General Felix Zollicoffer, who led his Rebels into battle, had been placed by a tree. Several Union soldiers had cut buttons from his jacket and pulled hair from his head as ghoulish mementos of the officer. When General Thomas learned of the desecration, he placed armed guards by the body. Eventually, Zollicoffer’s body was embalmed and sent back through the lines.⁴

The road to Eastern Tennessee, the objective that both Lincoln and McClellan so desperately urged, was now open with few Rebels standing in their way.

__________________

Halleck Waxes Strategical to McClellan

Having been down with the measles for nearly a week, General Henry Halleck, commander of Union troops in Missouri (and of Grant in Kentucky), must have had a lot on his mind as he laid sick in bed. On this date, he penned a long letter to General McClellan in Washington, explaining all that had happened and all that he hoped to happen soon in his department.

First, Halleck explained the situation in Missouri. General Curtis was being reinforced at Rolla, prior to an advance upon General Sterling Price near Springfield, 100 or so miles southwest. The reinforcements came from General John Pope’s division, still near Sedalia, 100 or so miles northwest of Rolla. Curtis now commanded 15,000.

For the northern part of the state, Halleck was less optimistic. He feared that the strategy for Missouri was one of political, rather than military, origin. He warned against the “pepper-box strategy,” which scattered the troops across wide swaths of ground, “so as to render them inferior in numbers in any place where they can meet the enemy.”

“The division of our force upon so many lines and points seems to me a fatal policy,” continued Halleck. While he (at least on paper) excused McClellan of any blame, he wondered if he (McClellan) might not be able to convince the new Secretary of War Edwin Stanton “to introduce a different policy and to make our future movements in accordance with military principles.”

On that point, Halleck had a few ideas. Prior to the Civil War, he had been known as “Old Brains” due to his scholarship on military strategy. In 1846, he published Elements of Military Art and Science, and though it was a glorified translation of Antoine-Henri Jomini’s Art of War, it won him great esteem throughout the army. It was of little surprise to anyone that Halleck was urging a military strategy.

Halleck warned that steaming down the Mississippi was not a proper line of operation. Instead, he wanted to see an attempt be made up the Cumberland and Tennessee Rivers. This would draw the Rebels from the Mississippi and from Bowling Green, Kentucky (giving Kentucky almost entirely to the Union). The objective would be Nashville.

Still, he had not heard from General Buell in Kentucky. What the Union war effort in the West needed most was for Halleck and Buell to work together. If Buell, who had been told to move on Eastern Tennessee for weeks now, was to move on Nashville, it would render Halleck’s idea redundantly dangerous, as the two armies would be moving “on converging exterior lines with the enemy inside of the angle — always a most hazardous operation, unless each of the exterior forces is superior to the enemy.”

For the time being, Halleck would focus upon General Curtis at Rolla. Once Price was cleared out of Missouri, Rebel recruitment was certain to settle down. It was clear that Union strategy in the West was still very fluid. This fluidity bothered Halleck, who hoped for a more concrete plan very shortly.⁵

1. Official Records, Series 1, Vol. 7, p89. [↩]
2. Official Records, Series 1, Vol. 7, p81. [↩]
3. Official Records, Series 1, Vol. 7, p110; 103. [↩]
4. “Mill Springs: The First Battle for Kentucky” by Ron Nicholas, appearing in The Civil War in Kentucky edited by Kent Masterson Brown, Savas Publishing, 2000. [↩]
5. Official Records, Series 1, Vol. 8, p508-511. [↩]

1 Comment »

Posted By Eric on January 19, 2012

January 19, 1862 (Sunday)

They marched north through the night, through a January thunderstorm. The column, led by General Felix Zollicoffer, 4,000-strong, stumbled upon Federal cavalry at dawn, greeting the sun with the rapid crackle of musket fire.

For over a month, the Rebels had been on the north bank of the Cumberland River, near Mill Springs, Kentucky, cut off from their comrades. As the Federals began to move south to crush them, they too were cut off by a swollen river. Seeing the chance at hand, Confederate General George B. Crittenden wanted to surprise and defeat them in detail before the waters allowed the enemy to unite.

The Union horsemen fell back and Zollicoffer deployed skirmishers, moving forward through the brisk morning. Their advance was halted as the handful of Federals clung to a piece of ground near a log cabin, giving couriers time to spread the word that the Rebels were advancing in large force.¹

To push the Federal skirmishers back into their camps, General Zollicoffer deployed his entire brigade. In the short amount of time it took him to form his four regiments, two Union regiments deployed to make a stand. For nearly an hour, the outnumbered Federals, soon joined by a third regiment, held back Zollicoffer’s Rebels.²

Zollicoffer took notice of the new Union regiment, but believed that they were men of his own brigade. Quickly, he rode over to the attacking regiment and ordered them to stop firing. As they obeyed the order, a hush fell over the battlefield. The commander of the opposite Union regiment, Col. Speed S. Fry, 4th Kentucky, took advantage of the lull to inspect his right flank.

At the same time, General Zollicoffer rode out towards the regiment he believed was friend, not foe. Col. He and Col. Fry saw each other and each believed the other to be on their side. They pulled close so they could hear each other speak.

“We must not shoot our own men,” said Zollicoffer to Speed.

“Of course not, I would not do so intensionally,” Speed replied.

Zollicoffer motioned towards something Speed could not see, saying, “those are our men.”

Both officers parted, still believing the other to be friendly. Fry rode back towards his regiment, but then turned around to see another officer, near where he had met Zollicoffer, level a pistol in his direction and fire. The ball struck Fry’s horse above the hip, but also convinced him that the officer he was just talking to was a Rebel. Fry, as well as he regiment, returned the fire. General Zollicoffer, pierced by three bullets, fell dead, as did the other officer. The Rebel regiment fled in confusion.³

As a Confederate reserve regiment was thrown forward to plug the gap left by the retreat, General Crittenden ordered part of his second brigade, under General William Carroll, to join the main line and advance.⁴

Seeing all of this was Union commander General George Thomas, who had been reinforced the night before by three regiments under General Schoepf. He ordered two fresh regiments to replace the Indiana and Kentucky regiments that had, thus far, held back the Rebel tide. He also saw that Crittenden’s new advance would flank him on the left, and sent three regiments and a battery of artillery to cut him off.⁵

One of the fresh regiments, the 2nd Minnesota, arrived just as the Rebel charge reached it crescendo. They met at a fence and the Confederates poured round after round into the Minnesota boys. The lines drew so close to each other that it quickly devolved into a thirty minute hand-to-hand brawl.⁶

The rain, which had tapered off in the early morning, began to fall heavier upon both sides of the conflict. The Confederates, most of whom were armed with antiquated flintlocks, were more or less disarmed by the torrents of water fouling their pieces. Perhaps one in three muskets were serviceable. The men, poorly drilled and trained, being unable to fire, simply walked off the field.⁷

General Thomas could see that the Rebels were breaking and ordered a general advance. The battle had lasted barely three hours. The Union right, led by the 9th Ohio, made up of many soldiers from the 1848 German revolution, sprang forth in a bayonet charge, shattering the Rebel left flank. The whole line gave way and was routed.

Crittenden still had a couple fresh regiments remaining, and threw them at the Union advance, holding them up long enough to drive his fleeing soldiers like cattle back towards their camp along the Cumberland River. Overcome by sheer volume, even the fresh Rebel regiments soon gave way.

But Thomas did not immediately pursue. The charges and victory had taken a toll on his men, who needed to be rested and resupplied. This pause allowed Crittenden’s Rebels to regroup behind their entrenchments along the Cumberland.⁸

Shortly before nightfall, Thomas’ troops arrived before the Confederate trenches. Seeing that they could not be easily taken, he ordered them to be bombarded with artillery, which was kept up until it was fully dark.⁹

Under that darkness, Crittenden and a few of his officers held a council of war, deciding to abandon the north bank of the Cumberland as quietly as possible. He wanted to pull it off without Thomas being any the wiser.

Throughout the night, a steamboat and two small ferries shuttled the Rebels to safety. While he could bring all of this men, including the sick and wounded, Crittenden had to leave behind eleven cannons, as well as horses, mules, wagons and nearly all of the army’s camp equipment.

By morning, all of the Confederates had crossed over. Thomas never suspected a thing.¹⁰

The Union suffered 39 killed, with 207 wounded, while the Rebels reported 125 killed, 309 wounded, and 95 captured or missing. In both cases, the figures are probably a little low.¹¹

1. Official Records, Series 1, Vol. 7, p84. The OR is being used as much as possible, but also “Mill Springs: The First Battle for Kentucky” by Ron Nicholas, appearing in The Civil War in Kentucky edited by Kent Masterson Brown, Savas Publishing, 2000, was also used throughout this post. [↩]
2. Official Records, Series 1, Vol. 7, p107. [↩]
3. Kentucky: A History of the State by J.H. Battle, 1887. The above comes specifically from a post-war letter written by Col. Fry. [↩]
4. Official Records, Series 1, Vol. 7, p107. [↩]
5. Official Records, Series 1, Vol. 7, p80. [↩]
6. Official Records, Series 1, Vol. 7, p95. [↩]
7. Official Records, Series 1, Vol. 7, p114. [↩]
8. “Mill Springs: The First Battle for Kentucky” by Ron Nicholas, appearing in The Civil War in Kentucky edited by Kent Masterson Brown, Savas Publishing, 2000. [↩]
9. Official Records, Series 1, Vol. 7, p80. [↩]
10. Official Records, Series 1, Vol. 7, p110. [↩]
11. “Mill Springs: The First Battle for Kentucky” by Ron Nicholas, appearing in The Civil War in Kentucky edited by Kent Masterson Brown, Savas Publishing, 2000. Based upon figures given by Thomas and Crittenden in the OR. [↩]

No Comments »